Abstract-Recently, establishing a VoIP call using a P2P network instead of regular SIP-servers has been proposed; this novel approach to SIP-signaling is commonly referred to as P2PSIP and technically based on a Distributed Hash Table (DHT). P2P networks are advantageous with respect to reliability and scalability. However, securing DHTs against adversary nodes which intentionally interrupt functionality of the network remains a major research problem. In particular, even if a trusted enrollment server is used for secure identifier assignment of participating nodes, attacks on overlay routing by malicious nodes that have successfully joined the network can still severely degrade the lookup service of the DHT.
I. INTRODUCTION
ecently, there has been considerable activity in research [1] [2] as well as standardization [3] regarding signaling in SIP networks facilitated by a P2P network (commonly referred to as P2PSIP) instead of SIP servers as specified in RFC 3261 [4] . All of these proposals for P2PSIP use a Distributed Hash Table ( DHT) (e.g., Chord [5] ) as the underlying substrate for building a P2P-network with formal guarantees on lookups, i.e., a so-called Structured Overlay Network.
However, securing DHTs in a network where a large amount of nodes does not behave according to the DHT protocol (i.e., a network containing adversary nodes) is still a research challenge [6] [7] [8] . In particular, even if some data item is stored in the network, lookup success cannot be guaranteed with today's DHTs in the presence of adversary nodes [9] [10] . With respect to many possible attacks on P2PSIP networks [11] , we investigate the availability of the lookup service, i.e., the ability for a caller to receive the current location for a particular callee during a Denial-ofService attack on the DHT routing-layer by participating nodes in the network.
Securing P2PSIP networks against attacks on the DHTrouting layer is even more challenging than other DHT-based applications. With VoIP as the application, not only lookup success is of concern in a network with adversary nodes. Even if a lookup for the location of a callee in the P2P network is successful, the caller expects to retrieve this information in reasonable time in order to start communicating. Hence, in contrary to less time-sensitive applications, attackers can degrade the functionality of a P2PSIP network already severely by delaying (possibly eventually successful) lookups. While there exist a few early-stage P2PSIP prototypes [12] [13], work on a secure naming system for P2PSIP [14] , and general simulation studies of DHT-based P2P networks under attack [8] [9] [10], we present the first P2PSIP system that can emulate malicious nodes. Further, our emulation setup allows the injection of large amounts of automatically generated SIP traffic (SIP-Invite messages) into the network. This enables the measurement of the corresponding success rate of reaching the desired callee as well as the maximum call-setup time while the network is under attack in an actual P2P network. In addition, we implemented secure routing techniques and evaluated their effect on lookup success in a P2PSIP network. Overall, the setup we present in this paper provides the ability to study a P2PSIP network during a Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack on the DHT-routing layer and the effect of corresponding security techniques in a real environment.
How the establishment of a SIP-session can be achieved with a P2P network in principle as well as the corresponding security challenges are described in section II and III, respectively. Section IV presents the rationale that led to our emulated system and an overview of our implementation. Advanced security techniques we implemented to test their effects on lookup success in an actual P2PSIP network are introduced in section V. Experiments we conducted and the corresponding results are detailed in section VI. Section VII discusses limitations of our approach. Section VIII concludes the paper with a summary and an outlook on future work.
II. P2PSIP
Technically, P2PSIP replaces all servers used in regular SIP signaling for locating the callee of a phone call (or similar multimedia communications) with a Structured Overlay Network based on a Distributed Hash Table (DHT) 1 such as CAN [15] , Chord [5] , or Pastry [16] . These networks can guarantee with high probability that a search request will succeed if the corresponding data item is stored in the network. Additionally, formal proofs exist on the number of routing hops that are necessary for a lookup to reach the node in the network that stores the desired content [15] [5] [16] . A DHT can provide the following basic functionality to participating nodes: Given a key (as a search request initiated by a query node), the network returns the node responsible for storing data belonging to that key. As an example DHT we use Chord [5] . Chord maps participating nodes onto an m-bit node-ID by hashing the IP-address of the node as well as keys onto an m-bit key-ID by hashing the key, using the same hash function for both mappings. A virtual ring is used as the DHT structure and nodes are responsible for storing data items for keys which have a key-ID that is equal to or less than their node-ID but larger than the node-ID of the predecessor in the ring. For routing, each node maintains two routing tables: a list of s direct successors in the ring and a finger table with m links to nodes further away in the ring. Chord offers two different routing strategies: recursive and iterative routing. With recursive routing, a lookup request gets forwarded hopby-hop through the network until it reaches the node responsible for storing the corresponding data item. In contrary, with iterative routing every hop node on a lookup path sends back the next hop to the original query node which in turn contacts this next hop to make lookup progress. Figure 1 shows how SIP-signaling based on a DHT works in principle: To use a DHT for locating SIP users, the SIP-URI is the key and the corresponding data item stored in the network is the current location of the corresponding user. The example displays a Chord DHT in a schematic view where a user Alice wants to call another user Bob whose key-ID (i.e., the hash of his SIP-URI) is 206. Alice's and Bob's user agents have joined the network with node ID 33 and 231, respectively. In order to receive calls, Bob registers his SIP-URI in the DHT as a store request (1), resulting in node 215 storing the current location (e.g., IP-address and port) where Bob can be reached. When Alice wants to call Bob, she can ask the overlay for the node which is responsible for Bob's URI: She computes the key-ID for Bob's URI by hashing his SIP-URI and invokes lookup(key) as a service offered by the overlay (2) . In this example, the lookup request gets routed recursively through the overlay and finally returns the IPaddress and port of the node responsible for the requested content (Bob's current location), node 215 (3). Alice can then contact node 215 directly without using the overlay to receive Bob's location (4) . Finally, Alice can contact Bob (5) directly (again without using the overlay) and use regular SIP signaling peer-to-peer between Alice and Bob to arrange parameters and establish a multimedia session.
III. P2PSIP SECURITY, SCOPE, AND ATTACKER MODEL Security challenges for P2PSIP have been investigated in [11] and include attacks on node-ID assignment, attacks on DHT routing (such as man-in-the-middle attacks and attacks on the availability of the DHT as a whole), integrity of registration bindings stored as data items in the DHT, authentication, and bootstrapping.
In this paper, we investigate attacks on DHT routing. We are interested in the availability of the lookup service under real-time constraints, i.e., the ability for a caller to receive the current location for a particular callee during a Denial-ofService attack on routing on the DHT layer by participating nodes in the network. As can be observed in Figure 1 , adversary nodes on the recursive routing path could easily prevent a query node from reaching the location of the target callee, e.g., by not correctly routing messages (nodes with ID 159, 200, and 215 in the example). These kinds of attacks are the concern of this paper and we investigate regular Chord routing and advanced algorithms for step (3) in Figure 1 .
We assume a P2PSIP network where secure node-ID assignment is deployed against Sybil-attacks [7] (where a single attacker tries to generate multiple virtual node IDs) and against so-called chosen location attacks (in which attackers deliberately choose a location in the DHT to cut off traffic from specific target nodes). This property can be achieved through a central authority like an enrollment server 2 . As an alternative, there exists formal work to achieve this property [17] [18] as well as other more practical solutions [19] . Secure node-ID assignment prevents some important attacks on DHTs. However, it is important to acknowledge that even under this assumption adversary nodes can degrade the availability of a DHTs lookup service significantly [10] . For instance, consider the case were nodes that had been previously authenticated by an enrollment server are infected with malicious software such as a trojan horse or as part of a bot-net. In this case, a single attacker can launch a Denial-ofService attack on the DHT's lookup service by having all 2 Note that this is the solution that the P2PSIP Working Group in the IETF is currently envisioning against the beforehand mentioned attacks [3] . This full text paper was peer reviewed at the direction of IEEE Communications Society subject matter experts for publication in the IEEE "GLOBECOM" 2008 proceedings.
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nodes under his control block legitimate lookup requests in the network. In this scenario, secure node-ID assignment merely assures that attacker nodes are distributed uniformly in the network [19] . In general, an enrollment server (or similar solutions) prevents an attacker from joining the network with a large amount of nodes or at some specific location but it does not prevent nodes that have successfully joined the network from acting maliciously. We consider a simple attacker model: A network of n nodes is infiltrated by f*n (f<1) malicious nodes (e.g., because they have been compromised) which drop messages instead of routing them to their destination. We deliberately chose this attacker model because despite being simple this attacker behavior already significantly decreases lookup availability (as we will show). Since we view this work as an initial investigation of P2P security under real-time constraints, we were interested how badly even a simple attacker behavior can downgrade lookup success and to what extent security techniques can help. Note that there can be stronger attacker models where colluding adversary nodes forward messages to each other to absorb more DHT routing resources in vain [9] [10]. We regard emulating these attacker models important future work. Attacks on the IP-layer are outside the scope of this paper; we concentrate solely on the DHT-routing layer.
IV. SYSTEM DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION

A. Requirements, Rationale, and Design
Our goal being security, in contrary to other approaches [12] [13] we do not focus on SIP-protocol details or current standardization proposals for P2PSIP [3] . Instead, we envisioned a simple P2PSIP implementation which follows the generic architecture depicted in Figure 1 . Therefore, our results are of general nature and apply to any P2PSIP approach that follows the schematic signaling flow depicted in Figure 1 . To study P2PSIP security in a generic way, we envisioned an architecture where every node in the DHT represents a single SIP-client (i.e., SIP user agent) with a single SIP-URI. This setting enables us to generate uniformly distributed session establishment attempts and to statistically measure lookup success. This is not a limitation because other architectures where each DHT-node represents more than one SIP user agent can be seen as an extension of this setting.
To assure proper functioning of the prototype, the establishment of a SIP session and corresponding phone call between two regular SIP clients must be possible and tested. However, in order to run experiments with a large number of phone calls (to measure the average success rate of lookups and the maximum call-setup time), it is not feasible to start calls by hand. Thus, a key requirement is that a large amount of SIP call establishment attempts can be generated automatically. Further, to have realistic non-biased experiments, it is necessary that generated calls are triggered distributed uniformly 3 over all participating nodes (as origin) and all participating keys (as target) in the network.
B. Implementation
Similar to other P2PSIP proposals [3] [12], our implementation is based on Chord [5] . We used OpenChord [20] as the core DHT and implemented a DHT/SIP-Adaptor with Jain-SIP [21] . Figure 2 display the overall architecture of our system. As depicted, the single DHT/SIP-Adaptor can send and receive overlay messages to/from all nodes currently in the network. Thus, the adaptor "controls" an experiment which consists of a multitude of SIP-requests from various callers to various callees. Messages are generated with SIPp [22] and send to the adaptor which triggers the corresponding DHT request. The result of a DHT lookup as well as statistical data is stored in a MySQL database by the adaptor before it passes the corresponding SIP message on to the SIP user agent client (SIPp) which initiated the location lookup.
The adaptor model allows for testing of new security techniques without changing the SIP-stack or firmware of phones 4 . Additionally, with this setup the single adaptor can measure results and statistical data for analysis of the behavior of the system. We also tested several regular SIP hard-/softphones with this setup and could successfully establish calls, demonstrating the overall functionality of the system. Figure 3 shows the general message flow for a SIP Invite request and the interaction between SIPp and the DHTAdaptor. When the adaptor receives a SIP Invite request, it fetches the callee's SIP-URI from the To-header, hashes it to determine the corresponding DHT key-ID, and starts a DHTlookup at a node randomly selected among the non-adversary DHT-nodes. If the DHT successfully returns the node responsible for storing the callee's location, the adaptor signals this node as the next routing hop to the caller (SIPp in our setup) via a SIP 302-moved temporarily response code. Using a 302 response code ensures compatibility with existing SIP-clients and at the same time cleanly encapsulates the DHT-lookup service for measurements. If the lookup does not succeed, a 404-not found response code gets returned to the caller. In any case, the total time and number of hops of the lookup get stored in a MySQL database by the adaptor. 
A. Iterative Routing and Backtracking
As highlighted in [11] , iterative routing enables the query node to verify that queries make progress towards the key and is thus preferable from a security perspective. We implemented an extension of iterative routing where at each routing step the whole routing table and direct successor list (instead of just a single next-hop node) of the hop node gets returned to the query node. This technique has the advantage that at each step the query node can decide on the next hop based on an advanced secure routing strategy (as outlined in subsection C and D). Further, we enhanced regular iterative Chord routing with backtracking. When a node does not reply to a routing request after a certain time-out, it is assumed to be malicious. In this case, the lookup continues by choosing the second best node from the previous routing hop according to the current routing strategy.
B. Self-Certifying SIP-URIs
In a P2PSIP network with untrusted nodes it is crucial that the integrity of content retrieved from the network (as a SIP-URI/location binding) can be verified. Otherwise, adversary nodes on the routing path or responsible for storing data items can manipulate content: In P2PSIP this means that attackers could redirect phone calls to hosts under their control by replacing the IP-address which is returned as a result of a lookup. In general, integrity of data items can be achieved with data items which are signed by the owner in conjunction with a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). This enables retrieving nodes to get the certificate of the signer and then to verify the integrity of a data item retrieved.
An alternative solution to ensure the integrity of content in P2PSIP is based on self-certifying SIP-URIs [23] . With this approach, SIP-URIs are cryptographically generated by hashing a public key. This enables the owner of a SIP-URI to cryptographically sign location-bindings stored in the DHT with the corresponding private key. By appending the public key to registrations stored in the DHT, any node that retrieves data items can verify that the public key belongs to the SIP-URI requested (by hashing the public key) and then use the public key to verify the location stored for that SIP-URI. In our system all participating nodes use self-certifying SIPURIs, are capable of verifying content retrieved from the network cryptographically, and only signed registration bindings are stored in the DHT. This ensures that the integrity of SIP registrations stored in the P2P network can be cryptographically verified by any node, rendering man-in-themiddle attacks on data items stored in the DHT infeasible.
C. Direct Replica Routing
In Chord, data items for keys are replicated at r nodes directly succeeding the node responsible for the key-ID in the ring structure. However, in regular Chord this replication is used only for reliability in the case that the node responsible for the data item fails or does not leave the network properly. In particular, if the responsible node for a key is malicious it can deny any access to the corresponding data item. Even worse, due to Chord's unidirectional greedy routing not only the node responsible for storing some content but also its direct predecessor in the Chord-ring can deny access to data items [10] . For instance, in the example in Figure 1 node 200 could deny all access to the data items stores at its successor in the ring, node 215, even when iterative routing is used.
To circumvent these problems we use a technique called Direct Replica Routing (DRR) which has been simulated in a general DHT environment in [10] . With this extension, nodes can route directly to nodes storing replicated data items without passing the node responsible for a particular data item nor its predecessor. This is achieved by using the direct successor list nodes maintain for reliability in routing. To be precise, if during an iterative routing hop the direct successor list received contains a node larger than the key-ID, this node might store replicated content (depending on the replication parameter r) for the key and can thus be contacted directly by the query node to get the corresponding data item.
D. Social Path Routing
To counter the characteristic of P2P-networks that other nodes are usually not trusted, Marti et al. have suggested using am external social network in conjunction with DHT-routing [24] . The assumption is that nodes with whom the query node has a transitive link in the social network can be trusted (at least with higher probability than the average DHT node) to not be malicious and behave according to the DHT protocol. This approach (called Social Path ROUTing, SPROUT) has the advantage that as lookups try to route along nodes with whom the query node has a transitive trust relationship in the social network, these hop nodes may be considered nonadversary. We implemented a variant of SPROUT where at each experiment a uniformly distributed social network is generated on top of the DHT, each non-adversary node having
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links to t random non-adversary nodes in the social network. These social links are preferred in routing as long as queries make progress towards the key (i.e., we preserve a unidirectional DHT routing structure).
VI. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
Using our emulated P2PSIP system, we conducted a multitude of experiments with various attacker rates. We investigated the success rate of regular recursive Chord routing as well as different combinations of security techniques as add-ons to iterative routing. Additionally, we looked at how the lookup success rate drops when there is a threshold on the maximum delay for a lookup to succeed.
A. Experimental Setup
The emulated system we designed can be distributed on many physical machines with several DHT-nodes running on different ports on each host. Node-IDs were computed by hashing the combination of IP-address, port, and a random number. By using a random number we emulated secure node-ID assignment and thus uniformly distributed node-IDs in our system. For all our experiments a network consisting of 100 random nodes distributed on two regular PCs 5 was generated with good and adversary nodes distributed uniformly over the node-ID space. As each node in the DHT represents a SIP user agent in our model, additionally 100 arbitrary self-certifying SIP-URIs were generated, each of these was associated with a DHT-node, and then stored in the network (i.e., the IPaddress/port of the corresponding DHT-node was stored for each SIP-URI). After the network had been built and keys had been stored, 1000 arbitrary lookups (i.e., SIP-Invite requests with a key randomly selected from the previously stored values) were generated and sent to the adaptor. These Invite-messages were only sent out from SIP-URIs belonging to non-adversary nodes and contained an existing (selfcertifying) SIP-URIs as the callee. The following settings were used in all experiments (our implementation allows changing each of these parameters): We set r,s,t=2 (in order to choose these parameters in relation to the chosen network size) and m=160 (using SHA-1 as the hash function). After initial measurements we set the time after which a hop was considered as malicious by the query node to 400ms, ensuring that responses by non-adversary nodes will be received within this threshold. Figure 4 shows the lookup success rate for attacker rates f=0.0,…,0.8. Each result represents the average of all values obtained in 8 runs with each run consisting of setting up a new random network as described previously and executing 1000 lookups. The results show that regular Chord routing can hardly provide successful lookups in a network under attack. It can be observed that using DRR or SPROUT with iterative backtracking significantly increases lookup success compared to regular recursive Chord. For attacker rates with f>0.2, SPROUT outperforms DRR. Iterative backtracking combined 5 AMD Turion64X2-2GHz, 2GB RAM; AMD Athlon64-2GHz, 1GB RAM with SPROUT and DRR performs best. For all attacker rates with f>0.2, this combination at least doubles the success rate. Further, for moderately infiltrated networks (i.e., where 0.0<f<0.4, which might be realistic attacker rates considering the case where participating nodes get compromised by a bot-net), this solution can achieve a lookup success rate of at least 70%. To analyze the effectiveness of DHT-routing security addons under timing-constraints, we filtered out the lookups that were successful within a certain number of hops from the result-database. As an example, Figure 5 shows the average lookup success rate for a hop threshold t h =5, i.e., only lookups that were successful within 5 hops were considered. The average round trip time in the Internet can be assumed as 200ms [25] . In the worst case, all but one hops resulted in a time-out failure, each of these time-outs delaying the lookup by 400ms in our setup. Under these rough estimations, Figure  5 displays the lookup success rate under the constraint that the node storing the location of the callee was found in at most 1800ms, showing that even though all security techniques we explored use hop-costly backtracking, they can substantially
B. Results
improve lookup success under timing constraints 6 . In both figures, for f>0.6 using DRR in addition to SPROUT does not improve lookup success. This is because with very high attacker rates, even the nodes storing replicated content in the DHT are malicious with high probability.
VII. LIMITATIONS AND DISCUSSION
The results we present in this paper are obtained from a rather small network that consists of only 100 nodes. However, our system can easily be run on multiple hosts with bigger memory, emulating networks in the range of several 1000 nodes. Note that some of the P2PSIP use-cases envision application scenarios with network sizes in this range [3] . Also, our results originate from a local setup, preventing realistic lookup delay findings. Therefore, we used the hop count and estimated Internet-scale round trip times. Finally, we emulated a static network without nodes joining or leaving the network (so-called Churn) during experimental runs.
While admittedly these limitations but some constraints on the transferability of our results to large Internet-scale P2PSIP networks, it is important to realize that our results provide an upper bound on lookup success for any larger network: Analytically it can be shown that as network size increases the average lookup success rate decreases (assuming the same attacker rate) [10] , possibly even worsened by Churn. We verified this analytic result with some initial experiments on 200-node networks. Thus, any algorithm that provides unsatisfactory outcome in small networks in our system must be regarded as not useful in larger networks.
Overall, our system provides the ability to study P2PSIP-security in a real environment and can easily be extended to test new secure routing algorithms (providing upper bounds on lookup success for larger networks). By emulating random traffic, our system offers short-term estimations regarding the usefulness of algorithms in an actual network without the need to deploy nodes Internet-wide, e.g., via planetlab.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We presented a P2PSIP system with emulated adversary nodes and used it to study a real implementation of a P2PSIP network during Denial-of-Service attacks on the DHT-routing layer. Our results show that even in a relatively small-sized network and with a simple strategy, attackers can significantly degrade the service of locating a callee, demonstrating the need for further research on securing P2PSIP networks. We analyzed the effect of several secure routing techniques on the lookup success rate as well as on the maximum call-setup time in our P2PSIP system, with promising results.
In general, our system enables to analyze different attacker models and to study future novel security techniques in an actual P2PSIP network with relatively little effort. As future work, we intend to emulate stronger attacker models, larger networks, and to use our system to explore more innovative security mechanisms for P2PSIP.
